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Evan Selinger* and Woodrow Hartzog**
ABSTRACT
Governments and companies often use consent to justify the use
of facial recognition technologies for surveillance. Many proposals
for regulating facial recognition technology incorporate consent
rules as a way to protect those faces that are being tagged and
tracked. But consent is a broken regulatory mechanism for facial
surveillance. The individual risks of facial surveillance are
impossibly opaque, and our collective autonomy and obscurity
interests aren’t captured or served by individual decisions.
In this article, we argue that facial recognition technologies
have a massive and likely fatal consent problem. We reconstruct
some of Nancy Kim’s fundamental claims in Consentability:
Consent and Its Limits, emphasizing how her consentability
framework grants foundational priority to individual and social
autonomy, integrates empirical insights into cognitive limitations
that significantly impact the quality of human decision-making
when granting consent, and identifies social, psychological, and
legal impediments that allow the pace and negative consequences of
innovation to outstrip the protections of legal regulation.
We also expand upon Kim’s analysis by arguing that valid
consent cannot be given for face surveillance. Even if valid
individual consent to face surveillance was possible, permission for
such surveillance is in irresolvable conflict with our collective
autonomy and obscurity interests. Additionally, there is good
reason to be skeptical of consent as the justification for any use of
facial recognition technology, including facial characterization,
verification, and identification.
* Evan Selinger is a Professor of Philosophy at Rochester Institute of Technology.
** Woodrow Hartzog is Professor of Law and Computer Science at Northeastern
University School of Law and Khoury College of Computer Sciences. The authors
would like to thank Kyle Berner for his excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Surveillance” is an ominous word. In the post-Snowden
world, it evokes Orwellian watchers who observe our every move,
as persistent as they are powerful. Given the strong reactions the
term can evoke, why hasn’t greater resistance manifested against
surveillance threats? An important reason is that surveillance
technology is deployed in ways that make us feel comfortable with,
not creeped out by, the algorithms and people observing us. 1
Facebook, for example, is designed to be an environment that feels
so intimate that users focus on sharing information with friends
without thinking about “surveillance capitalism” and all of the
data the company collects, analyzes, and monetizes on the back
end. 2 At airports and concerts, the experience of using facial
recognition technology, a tool that is used for racial profiling and
tracking in China and to scan the streets of Russia for “people of
interest,” can feel like a godsend, saving us and everyone else who
socially conforms from waiting in long frustrating lines. 3 The more
familiar and beneficial a surveillance technology like facial
recognition seems, the easier it is for technology companies,
government agencies, and entrepreneurs to create conditions for
widespread passive acceptance.
Normalization, which involves treating facial recognition
technology as a mundane part of the machinery that is necessary
for powering a complex digital society, and function creep, which
entails incrementally expanding how the technology is used, mask
harms to individual and collective autonomy. They make it easy
for surveillers to operate within a permissive regulatory regime:
one that has porous boundaries between the government and the
private sector, and treats consent as the basis for authorizing
permission for watching, tagging, tracking, and sorting. 4 Even
when our consent is obtained through questionable means,
perhaps nudged by dark patterns and hidden options, many of us
1. See Evan Selinger, Why Do We Love To Call New Technologies “Creepy”?, SLATE
(Aug. 22, 2012), https://slate.com/technology/2012/08/facial-recognition-softwaretargeted-advertising-we-love-to-call-new-technologies-creepy.html.
2. Evan Selinger, Facebook Fabricates Trust Through Fake Intimacy, MEDIUM
(Jun. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/s/trustissues/facebook-fabricates-trust-throughfake-intimacy-b381e60d32f9.
3. Ian Sample, What is facial recognition-and how sinister is it?, THE GUARDIAN
(July 29, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/29/what-is-facialrecognition-and-how-sinister-is-it.
4. For more on normalization and function creep, see BRETT FRISCHMANN AND
EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY (2018).
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will say yes when companies ask for it while engaging in
surveillance or surveillance-related activities. 5 With limited
alternatives to choose from and barriers to collective action that
impede creating new, less surveillance intensive options, assenting
to surveillance seems like the most rational “choice” for avoiding
the penalties that come from being an opt-out outlier while
accruing whatever take-it-or-leave-it benefits are offered by the
consent-seeker, however meager they may be.6
The law has long struggled with problems associated with
consent. In Consentability: Consent and Its Limits, Nancy Kim
provides a promising path forward by integrating legal and ethical
scholarship on consent with scientific inquiry into humanity’s
predictable irrationality. Drawing from these interdisciplinary
resources, she constructs a new consentabilty framework and
applies it to difficult cases: assisted suicide, body modification
(from cosmetic surgery to RFID chip implants), bodily integrity
exchanges (sexual services, surrogacy, and organ sales), and
experimental activities (such as traveling to Mars and becoming
cryopreserved).
In this article, we draw upon Kim’s work along with our
previous research on surveillance and privacy theory to make one
simple point: facial recognition technologies probably have a fatal
consent problem. After reviewing some of Kim’s main ideas, we
will apply aspects of her framework to explore how facial
recognition technologies generally, and face surveillance
specifically, affects us in ways that are difficult for most people to
appreciate.
When we use the term face surveillance, we mean the use of
facial recognition technologies and faceprint or name-faceprint
databases to monitor behavior, identify people, or gain insight or
information for the purposes of influencing, managing, directing,
or deterring people. Examples include real-time observation,
tracking, and identifying people in airports, retail stores, and
public parks, as well as using faceprints and algorithms to identify
and analyze people in stored photos and videos for law
enforcement, commercial, and marketing purposes. The Future of
Privacy Forum conceptualized instances of “identification: one to
many” as situations where software tries to determine who an
5. For more on the conflicts between design and valid consent, see WOODROW
HARTZOG PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2018).
6. See Frischmann and Selinger, supra note 4.
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unknown person is, and “unique persistent identifiers,” which are
cases where algorithms try to determine what someone is doing “in
a limited context, not linked to other personal identifiable
information?” 7 We also use the terms “facial detection,” which are
instances of software trying to determine if a face can be found in
a picture, and “facial characterization,” which are situations where
algorithms code assumptions about faces, such as emotions people
might be experiencing.
We argue that valid consent is not possible for face
surveillance in many of its current and proposed applications
because of its inevitable corrosion of our collective autonomy, to say
nothing of the dubious validity of individual consent in these
Additionally, we argue that some forms of
contexts. 8
characterization are inconsentable due to collective autonomy
problems and are at least vulnerable to defective consent. Even
“1:1 facial identification” features are highly subject to defective
consent and should be highly scrutinized. Only facial detection
tools (“is this a face?”) seem entitled to the benefit of the doubt
because they are not used to persistently track, identify, or
manipulate people.
One reason consent to facial recognition is highly suspect is
that people do not and largely cannot possess an appropriate level
of knowledge about the substantial threats that facial recognition
technology poses to their own autonomy.9 Additionally, the
framing of this debate around the amorphous concept of individual
“privacy” has hidden unjustifiable risks to two of the most
important values implicated by facial recognition: obscurity and
collective autonomy. Even if some people withhold consent for face
surveillance, others will inevitably give it. Rules that facilitate
this kind of permission will normalize behavior, entrench
organizational practices, and fuel investment in technologies that
7. Brenda
Leong,
FPF
Releases
Understanding
Facial
Detection,
Characterization, and Recognition Technologies and Privacy Principles for Facial
Recognition Technology in Commercial Applications, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Final-Privacy-PrinciplesEdits-1.pdf.
8. In addition to drawing from our own research and prior collaborations, our
approach to analyzing consent will integrate insights from Neil Richards and Woodrow
Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461 (2019).
9. The entire field of behavioral economics is built around the idea that people
have limited knowledge and capacity as decisionmakers. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING FAST AND SLOW 4 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux ed., 2011); DAN ARIELY,
PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (HarperCollins ed., 2008); CASS SUNSTEIN AND RICHARD
THALER, NUDGE (2008).
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will result in a net increase of surveillance. Expanding a
surveillance infrastructure will increase the number of searches
that occur which, in itself, will have a chilling effect over time as
law enforcement and industry slowly but surely erode our
collective and individual obscurity.
Building an infrastructure to facilitate surveillance will also
provide more vectors for abuse and careless errors. No one is
perfect, and the more requests for permission to surveil that are
made the more harm from mistakes and malice will exist.
Additionally, the larger and more entrenched facial recognition
infrastructure becomes, the more opportunities exist for law
enforcement to bypass procedural rules on searches to obtain
information directly from industry.
For example, if the
government were prohibited from directly using facial recognition
technologies, it could purchase people’s location data obtained from
facial recognition technology (and thus linked to their identities)
from private industry. Procedural rules wouldn’t address the true
harm of these technologies without further prohibitions to prevent
end-runs around the aims of a restriction.
We conclude this article with the argument that to defend
against these dangers, lawmakers should pursue strong policy
measures beyond procedural protections such as warrant
requirements and informed consent frameworks. At a minimum,
lawmakers should immediately enact moratoriums to prevent
entrenchment of and dependence on facial recognition systems
before they can be properly considered by lawmakers and society.
In all areas where consentability conditions cannot be met, and
procedural rules and compliance frameworks for government and
industry will facilitate an outsized harm and abuse relative to their
gains, facial recognition technology should be outright banned.
II. CONSENTABILITY AND INVALID CONSENT
Consent is a foundational concept in the American law. As
one of us wrote with Neil Richards,
We live in a society that lionizes individual choice in the many
social roles we play every day, whether as consumers, citizens,
family members, voters, lovers, or employees. Consent
reinforces fundamental cultural notions of autonomy and
choice. It transforms the moral landscape between people and
makes the otherwise impossible possible.1 It is essential to the
exercise (and waiver) of fundamental constitutional rights,
and it is at the essence of political freedom, whether we are
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talking broadly about a “social contract” or making political
choices for individual candidates and referenda in the voting
booth. 10

Morally and legally, consent involves the “‘intentional transfer of
rights and obligations between parties,’ which transforms the
moral landscape between them and makes the otherwise
impossible possible.” 11
Kim noted that “[c]onsent in the law is typically viewed as a
conclusion, an all-or-nothing concept where the actions of the
parties are considered objectively and statically.”12 The problem
with this, Kim argued, is that “[t]his conception provides no
guidance regarding which acts should be consentable.”13 According
to Kim, “while the requirement of consent recognizes the value of
autonomous decision-making, the validity of consent hinges upon
the context in which it is given and the dynamic unleashed by both
parties.” 14 This means that valid consent is not only suspect in
some contexts, but not even possible. She labels this concept
regarding the circumstances under which consent can be valid
“consentability.”
In Kim’s framework, consentability revolves around two
requirements. First, an individual must be able to validly consent
to a proposed activity. This means that they can intentionally
manifest consent, possess the requisite knowledge in light of the
motive for consenting, and exercise their volition to do so. Second,
the social benefits of the activity must outweigh the social harms.
In both cases, Kim maintains there is a range of fundamental yet
hierarchically differentiable interests that the liberal state should
safeguard: equality, justice and due process, public safety,
democracy, free market capitalism, the right to bodily integrity,
freedom of movement, civil and political rights, and property
rights. At their core, Kim contends all these interests are
expressions of autonomy, which she argues is a primary societal
value. Since people can be born into a range of life-impacting
circumstances that are beyond their control, the fairest way to
foster and protect everyone’s autonomy is to configure a social
order that promotes liberty for all citizens. While individuals have
10. Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96
WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2019).
11. Id. at 1462, 1468.
12. NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 3 (2019).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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autonomy interests at the personal level, Kim also identifies
collective autonomy interests, which she defines as “the interest
that all members of a society have in a particular right.” From this
structural perspective, if a clash occurs over comparable autonomy
interests, Kim insists that “the collective autonomy interest
prevails over the individual autonomy interest.”15
At the individual level, Kim identified three essential features
underlying legal determinations of consent.
They are “an
intentional manifestation of consent, knowledge, and
volition/voluntariness.” 16 Ideally, a person should not agree to an
offer unless she understands what it entails, freely chooses to enter
into the agreement, and demonstrates her agreement through
clear words or deeds. In the real world, however, each condition is
challenging. Voluntariness is vexing because real people, unlike
hypothetically postulated rational actors, are bound by so many
constraints that “no human being is truly or ideally autonomous
all the time.” 17 Clear affirmation is debated because the standard
is context dependent.
For example, Kim endorses some
transactions requiring the consenting party to sign once at the end
of a contract. However, she objects to the one-and-done practice
being used in other circumstances, such as manifesting “consent to
a bodily integrity contract where the consenter agrees to transfer
his kidney.” 18 While these are daunting complications, Kim deems
the knowledge condition to be the hardest one to satisfy. This is
because people can make poor decisions not only when they lack
pertinent information, but also when they have access to all of the
relevant details.
The problem of missing information is self-evident. But why
doesn’t having enough of it suffice for making informed decisions?
It is because the quality of information matters. In order for
information to be useful, it must be “understandable and salient.” 19
Unfortunately, U.S. contract law exacerbates the problem. It
incentivizes creating contracts that use jargon and provide
overwhelming amounts of detail. 20 As a result, online user
agreements regularly minimize the consent seeker’s liability by
hiding risks in plain sight.
15. NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 84, 88 (2019).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Id. at 55.
18. Id. at 122.
19. NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 125 (2019).
20. See, e.g., Frishmann & Selinger, supra note 4; Neil Richards and Woodrow
Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1484 (2019).
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To illustrate this problem, Kim declares that “a company that
creates a product that records a person’s conversations and collects
their images should not be able to justify those actions by claiming
that its customers consented by clicking ‘agree’ to the company’s
terms and conditions.” 21
To determine how to communicate a risky opportunity
without rendering consent illegitimate, Kim turns to cognitive
science and behavioral economic research on bounded rationality
and the dual-process model of human cognition. In accordance
with leading dual-process theorists, Kim maintains that human
decision-making capacity is flawed in many ways, often in ways
that we are unaware of. For example, we may not know whether
our decisions are guided by the deliberative or intuitive cognitive
system, if our decisions are impaired by heuristic techniques laden
with cognitive biases, if we are self-sabotaging by misperceiving
irrational decisions as rational ones, and if we are being swayed by
misleading or manipulative information. From this perspective,
people may make choices they later regret due to flawed heuristics
like representative, anchoring, and availability; cognitive biases
like overconfidence, optimism, and confirmation; heated emotional
and physical states; or an inclination towards social conformity. 22
While being attuned to cognitive limitations is necessary for
formulating communication criteria that satisfies the knowledge
condition, it is also insufficient. When consent is sought, the
quality of information provided must be calibrated to adjust for two
things: how much risk the transaction poses to individual and
collective autonomy, and how trustworthy the consent-seeking
parties are. Kim thus tailors her consentability framework on a
sliding scale of consent standards. The greater the risk to
autonomy, the more she believes a person is entitled to
understand. For extremely risky situations, such as ones that
could lead to “permanent disfigurement,” Kim argues the
“conditions of consent must be established with absolute certainty,
the equivalent of the judicial standard ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” 23
By linking risk-level to the quality of consent-seeking
disclosures, Kim derives a basis for demarcating valid from invalid
consent at the individual level. She argues that consent is invalid
if “the threat to autonomy interest outweighs the robustness of the
21. KIM, supra note 12, at 119.
22. Id. at 13.
23. Nancy Kim, Consentability: Consent and Its Limits 83 (2019).
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consent conditions.” 24 This means that if a transaction poses a
great threat to autonomy and the consent conditions are not
commensurate with the risk, valid consent cannot be given.
Although it might seem that consent must be either valid or
invalid since an offer either can meet or fall short of the
consentability standard, things are actually more complicated. An
offer accepted under deficient consentability conditions results in
one of two outcomes. Either the transaction transpires without
genuine consent being given or else the offer is accepted through
“defective consent.” Kim characterizes this outcome as the
“purgatory between valid consent and non-consent.” 25 Kim’s
paradigm case of defective consent is a patient in an emergency
situation agreeing to a medical procedure out of fear that failing to
do so will pose high-level risks to her autonomy. In this instance,
the patient is not acting in a truly voluntary manner. Even when
professional standards nevertheless allow her to proceed with the
procedure, Kim maintains that contractual bargaining should not
transpire that includes terms that limit “the liability of the surgeon
for malpractice nor require the patient to agree to mandatory
arbitration in the event of a dispute.” 26
III. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY DYSTOPIA
Consentability contains a passage about technology-induced
change that is so bleak, it is worth quoting at length.
Technology will continue to push the boundaries of what
society thinks is acceptable. In some cases, the changes will
be gradual, occurring first on the fringes of society and
undetected by the public. . . . Sometimes the changes will go
undetected because they are not visible or obvious to most
people. As Lori Andrews observed in the context of genetics
policy, “When technologies are introduced incrementally and
policies are adopted in small units to deal with a few isolated
issues, there is less opportunity to stimulate a social debate
about whether we are moving in a direction in which we want
to go.” Companies, skilled in the art of marketing and sales,
may try to manipulate the public and intimidate lawmakers
into accepting products and services which degrade, rather
than enhance, social relations. Legislatures will be indifferent
or reluctant to act until there is some sort of social outcry or
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id. at 132.
26. Id.
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the impact on society is too great to ignore. The law will arrive
too late, after social norms have already been established and
when it is much more difficult to reverse society’s course. 27

Before showing how Kim’s consentability framework can be
applied to the facial recognition technology debates, we will sketch
the outline of dystopian future. The scenario is a thought
experiment about a possible world where the dire risks posed by
facial recognition technology poses are realized. The transition
from the present world to this hypothetical future could occur due
to structural problems like the ones Kim outlines in the above
passage.
Much of the discussion about the immediate and short to
medium term problems with facial recognition technology focuses
on the harm that could occur if the technology continues to produce
Law-abiding people could be put on
inaccurate results. 28
government watchlists, deprived of due process in court, prevented
from accessing places they should be allowed to enter, and
questioned or detained by law enforcement. Government and
industry could deny people access to their assets, deprive them of
job opportunities, and mischaracterize their identities and
behaviors. While everyone is vulnerable to these harms, false
positives and negatives disproportionately affect minorities,
especially people of color. 29 These discussions also emphasize that
the law poses few restrictions on facial recognition technology.
Furthermore, there is little transparency about how facial
recognition technology is used as we can see from the fact that state
legislatures are not required to openly debate and approve (i.e.,
consent) using driver’s license photos for government facial
Finally, internal policies for the
recognition databases. 30
27. NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY, CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS S 118-119 (2019).
28. See, e.g., Sahil Chinoy, The Racist History Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
10,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/facialrecognition-race.html; Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition is Accurate, if You’re a White
TIMES
(Feb.
9,
2018),
Guy,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificialintelligence.html; Natasha Singer, Amazon’s Facial Recognition Wrongly Identifies 28
TIMES
(July
26,
2018),
Lawmakers,
A.C.L.U.
Says,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/technology/amazon-aclu-facial-recognitioncongress.html.
29. See Joy Boulamwini, When the Robot Doesn’t See Dark Skin, N.Y. TIMES (June
21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/facial-analysis-technologybias.html.
30. Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE find state driver’s license photos are a gold mine for
facial-recognition
searches,
WASH.
POST
(July
7,
2019),
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Over time, advances in facial recognition technology might
eliminate all kinds of errors. Unfortunately, more accurate
versions of the technology pose even greater dangers because the
problems with facial surveillance are fundamental and unique.
Evan Greer contends, “Biometric surveillance powered by artificial
intelligence is categorically different than any surveillance we
have seen before. It enables real-time location tracking and
behavior policing of an entire population at a previously impossible
scale.” 31 The technology can be used to create chill that routinely
prevents citizens from engaging in First Amendment protected
activities, such as free association and free expression. They could
also gradually erode due process ideals by facilitating a shift to a
world where citizens are not presumed innocent but are codified as
risk profiles with varying potentials to commit a crime. In such a
world, the government and companies alike will find it easy to
excessively police minor infractions, similar to how law
enforcement already uses minor infractions as pretexts to cover up
more invasive motives.32 Surveillance tools bestow power on the
watcher. Abuse of the power that was once localized and costly
could become systematized, super-charged, and turnkey.
Companies could expand their reach of relentless and
manipulative marketing by peddling their wares over smart signs
that display personalized advertisements in public spaces. And as
more emotional states, private thoughts, and behavioral
predictions are coded from facial data, people will lose more and
more control over their identities. They could be characterized as
belonging to groups that they don’t identify with or don’t want
everyone knowing they belong to. And while schools might monitor
students more intensely and make the educational environment
more like a prison, bad actors will have opportunities to create
even more general security problems through hacking and
scraping.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice-find-state-driverslicense-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/.
31. Evan Greer, Don’t Regulate Facial Recognition. Ban it., BUZZFEED NEWS (July
18,
2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/evangreer/dont-regulate-facialrecognition-ban-it.
32. See Angela Caputo, Berwyn Police Rack up Citations with Questionable DUI
Checkpoints,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Sept.
20,
2015),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-berwyn-dui-checkpoints-met20150920-story.html.
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How might this social transformation occur? With the law
lagging behind innovation and an existing legacy of name-face
databases ripe for plug-and-play expansion, the perceived
advantages of easily and cheaply analyzing biometric faceprints
that link our on- and off-line lives could drive widespread adoption.
As this happens, people could get used to thinking of facial
recognition technology as the go-to solution for solving all kinds of
problems throughout society. Tired of remembering and entering
in a passcode to unlock your phone? Try facial recognition. Long
lines boarding a plane? Maybe facial recognition could help. Not
sure who’s knocking at your door? Facial recognition could tell you.
Missing your child while they’re at summer camp and want to
watch them play? Facial recognition to the rescue! And so on.
Patching social problems with technological solutions is easier
than mustering the will to solve harder issues around inequality,
education, and opportunity. The drumbeat of security stokes fear.
And enhancing convenience is a powerful motivating force in
American life. Consequently, it won’t be reasonable to expect most
people to grasp that they should summon the political will to push
back against incremental buildup of negative effects that initially
concentrate the worst outcomes on people of color and activists.
Immediate gratification, abstract perceptions of risk, and certain
harm is a recipe for doom.
IV. THE FRAMING PROBLEM: OBSCURITY, NOT
PRIVACY OR ANONYMITY
To apply Kim’s insights to the debate over facial recognition
technology, it is useful to begin by leveraging a concept from the
literature on cognition that she relies upon: framing effects. Word
choice can have a framing effect because how options and issues
are presented can impact how people perceive risks and what
solutions they propose. For example, since research into the
cognitive bias of loss aversion suggests that people tend to perceive
losses as more significant than gains, it matters whether doctors
describe a surgical procedure as having a 90% success rate or a
10% failure rate.33
33. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis 7 (Harper Colophon ed., 1974); Robert D.
Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611, 614 (2000); Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman,
Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103, 104 (2007); Laura E. Drake & William
A. Donohue, Communicative Framing Theory in Conflict Resolution, 23 COMM. RES.
297, 300 (1996); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341 (1984); Deborah Tannen, What’s in a Frame? Surface
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The debates over facial recognition technology, like other
debates over surveillance, are marred by the fact that they are
framed around the concepts of “privacy” and “anonymity” instead
of “obscurity.” 34 The harm from surveillance is often described as
But the concept of privacy is famously
loss of privacy. 35
amorphous. It can mean almost anything from secrecy to intimacy
to control to “the right to be let alone.”36 With respect to
surveillance, people often make the argument that as long as
you’re in “public,” people can already see you; since it is not
reasonable to ask people to avert their eyes in public, you allegedly
have no privacy in accessible spaces. 37 Others make the argument
that they don’t fear surveillance as a privacy threat because they
have “nothing to hide.”38 These arguments either reduce privacy
to secrecy and assume that only things that are completely stowed
away are worthy of protection, or else myopically frame privacy as
a concern for individuals, not society writ large.
At least initially, framing surveillance harms in autonomy
terms is also problematic. This is because the concept of autonomy
can be stretched in an almost limitless fashion. Jeb Rubenfeld
writes:
What, then, is the right to privacy? What does it protect? A
number of commentators seem to think that they have it when
they add the word ‘autonomy’ to the privacy vocabulary. But
to call an individual ‘autonomous’ is simply another way of
saying that he is morally free, and to say that the right to
privacy protects freedom adds little to our understanding of
the doctrine. To be sure, the privacy doctrine involves the
‘right to make choices and decisions,’ which, it is said, forms
the ‘kernel’ of autonomy. The question, however, is which

Evidence for Underlying Expectations, in Framing in Discourse 137 (Deborah Tannen
ed., 1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
34. See, e.g., Joseph Kupfer, Privacy, Autonomy, and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q.
81,81 (1987); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419
(1974).
35. See Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L. J. 1131, 1131
(2011).
36. See DANIEL SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 13 (First Harvard Univ. Press
eds., 2008).
37. For an exploration and rebuttal of this argument, see Woodrow Hartzog, The
Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 459, 461 (2019).
38. See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings
of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007).
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choices and decisions are protected? 39

While surveillance certainly implicates Kim’s twin foci of
individual and social autonomy, the concept of autonomy is likely
too broad to meaningfully and consistently resonate with people
who are making decisions that would put it at risk. In the context
of facial recognition technology, autonomy, like privacy, needs a
better, more specific, framing. We propose framing surveillance
issues generally, and facial recognition specifically, as a loss of
“obscurity,” a diminution that clearly detracts from many of the
goods that autonomy is valued for enabling.
To briefly summarize key points from our extensive prior
research, the concept of obscurity concerns transaction costs—the
ease or difficulty of finding information and correctly interpreting
it. 40 The harder it is to locate information or reliably understand
what it means in context, the safer, practically speaking, the
information is. Safety is a matter of probability, not certainty,
since a range of factors can change transaction costs. Examples of
such factors include advances in technological capabilities, the
democratization of technological functions, and advances in data
science. For much of history, obscurity has been protected by what
Harry Surden calls “structural constraints.” 41 These are not legal
protections, they are technological limitations such as a lack of
easy to use, inexpensive, and accurate means of identifying us,
tracking our movements, behaviors, and communications, and
inferring our thoughts and emotions. Structural constraints may
also be biological. For instance, the fact that the human cognitive
and perceptual systems can only make sense of and store limited
amounts of information without technological aid. While the
transaction costs imposed by warrant requirements, encryption
software, and other strategies provide some obscurity protections,
they are of limited value in a society that rules out privacy
protections in public and when information is disclosed to third
parties (e.g., the Third Party Doctrine). 42 They are also limited
39. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 750-52 (1989).
40. Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Obscurity and Privacy, in ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY (Joseph Pitt and Ashley Shew, eds.
Forthcoming 2014); Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of
Obscurity, 72 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2015); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic
Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2013); Woodrow
Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity By Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385 (2013).
41. Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605 (2007).
42. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561
(2009) (providing a defense of the third-party doctrine).

2019]

The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance

115

because our society fundamentally does not view privacy in terms
of nuanced categories. like select publics or private publics, where
information is meant to be disclosed to some audiences but not
everyone, rather than blunt ones like anonymity, which
presuppose that nobody knows who you are.
In order for people to be capable of giving valid consent to a
range of surveillance practices, including facial recognition, they
need to have a better understanding of how they rely on obscurity
to protect their privacy. By taking obscurity for granted, they miss
how it fosters individual autonomy. Obscurity enables people to
establish meaningful and intimate relationships because it allows
us to selectively disclose information and share different aspects of
our identity in different contexts.43 Obscurity enables us to
develop intellectually and emotionally by giving us breathing room
to embrace risks and make mistakes without the stigma of being
forever associated with failures and fads. 44 Obscurity enables
citizens to participate in democracy by allowing them to
confidently engage in political activities without worrying about
recriminations from the government.
However, such appreciation means little on its own. What
good is recognizing the value of obscurity if it is unobtainable?
Consequently, this understanding needs to be bolstered by
substantial changes to the privacy regulatory regime that provide
meaningful obscurity protections. At present, neither a great
obscurity awakening, nor a regulatory obscurity revolution are
likely; both entail too much of a departure from entrenched
theories and practices.
V. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: INDIVIDUAL
CONSENT AND COLLECTIVE AUTONOMY
Should facial recognition surveillance be consentable? By
appealing to Kim’s framework to answer this question, we must
ask whether it is possible to validly consent to the proposed
activity, and whether social harms caused by the activity outweigh
its social benefits. It seems unlikely that someone could give valid
consent to most forms of facial surveillance because the context in
which such consent would be sought frustrates the pre-conditions
for meaningful decision-making. In order for consent to data and
surveillance practices to be knowing and voluntary, at least three
43. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1956).
44. For an exploration on the importance of privacy for “play” and human
flourishing, see Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013).
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pre-conditions should exist: (1) such a request should be
infrequent, (2) the harms to be weighed must be vivid, and (3) there
should be incentives to take each request for consent seriously. 45
If the requests for consent are too frequent people will become
overwhelmed and desensitized. This renders them susceptible to
user interfaces and dense, confusing, turgid privacy policies that
are designed to exploit their exhaustion to extract consent. If the
harms are framed in terms of abstract notions of privacy and
autonomy or the possibility of abuse is too distant to be readily
foreseeable, then people’s cost/benefit calculus may be corrupted
by an inability to take adequate stock of the risks. Finally, if the
risk of harm is distributed over the course of many different
decisions—as is common with loss of obscurity through
surveillance—people will lack the proper incentive to take each
request for consent seriously. After all, no single decision
represents a significant threat. Instead, society is exposed to death
by a thousand cuts, with no particular cut rising to the threat level
where substantive and efficacious dissent occurs.
In the case of facial recognition technology things are further
complicated by the fact that the public is routinely given seemingly
good reasons to believe that the social benefits caused by
consenting to surveillance would outstrip any social harms. As we
previously described this illusory worldview:
From this perspective, you’ll never have to meet a stranger,
fuss with passwords, or worry about forgetting your wallet.
You’ll be able to organize your entire video and picture
collection in seconds—even instantly find photos of your kids
running around at summer camp. More important, missing
people will be located, schools will become safe, and the bad
guys won’t get away with hiding in the shadows or under
desks. Total convenience. Absolute justice. Churches
completely full on Sundays. At long last, our tech utopia will
be realized. 46

But many of these touted benefits are meager, incremental
improvements that could likely be approximated through less
dangerous means. For example, facial recognition is being
deployed to streamline the hassle associated with paper boarding
45. See Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent,
96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1466 (2019).
46. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition is the Perfect Tool for
Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-isthe-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66.
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passes, cash and debit cards, and passcodes and fingerprint
access. 47 But these technologies already worked reasonably (or
exceptionally) well. The legitimately compelling benefits, such as
finding missing people and keeping people safe, would require
large, promiscuous databases working with interconnected and
ubiquitous sensors making a mind-bogglingly large number of
fraught algorithmic decisions. Such an infrastructure would
extract a massive toll on our freedoms, civil liberties, and
autonomy.
Setting up this infrastructure also intrinsically
incentivizes its use due to the sunk cost fallacy, a cognitive bias
emphasized by the cognitive science literature that Kim discusses.
48
The sunk cost fallacy is the tendency for humans continue down
a particular course once they have made significant investment in
it.
Spending all the resources required for getting the
infrastructure built and stoking expectations that the
infrastructure is required for social progress would therefore make
it hard to change course and accept the reality that previous
resources could have been better spent.
The harms of facial surveillance are legion. The mere
existence of facial recognition systems, which are often invisible,
harms civil liberties because people will act differently if they
suspect they’re being surveilled. 49 Even legislation that promises
stringent protective procedures won’t prevent chill from impeding
crucial opportunities for human flourishing by dampening
expressive and religious conduct. Warrant requirements for facial
recognition will merely set the conditions for surveillance to occur,
which will normalize tracking and identification, reorganize and
entrench organizational structure and practices, and drive
government and industry investment in facial recognition tools
and infrastructure.
Facial recognition technology also enables a host of other
abuses and corrosive activities, many of which we outlined in the
47. See Brian Feldman, Replacing Touch ID With Face ID is a Worse Idea Than
You
Think,
N.Y.
INTELLIGENCER
(Sept.
12,
2017),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/09/replacing-touch-id-with-face-id-is-worse-thanyou-think.html; Betsy Isaacson, Facial Recognition Systems Turn Your Face Into Your
(July
19,
2013),
Credit
Card,
PIN,
Password,
HUFFPOST
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/facial-recognition-credit-card_n_3624752;
Gregory
Wallace, Instead of the Boarding Pass Bring Your Smile to the Airport, CNN (Sept. 10,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/cbp-facial-recognition/index.html.
48. See Jamie Ducharme, The Sunk Cost Fallacy is Ruining Your Decisions. Here’s
How, TIME (July 26, 2018), https://time.com/5347133/sunk-cost-fallacy-decisions/.
49. Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935
(2013).
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previous section.
•

Disproportionate impact on people of color and other
minority and vulnerable populations.

•

Due process harms, which might include shifting the
ideal from “presumed innocent” to “people who have
not been found guilty of a crime, yet.”

•

Facilitating harassment and violence.

•

Denial of fundamental rights and opportunities, such
as protection against “arbitrary government tracking
of one’s movements, habits, relationships, interests,
and thoughts.”

•

The suffocating restraint of the relentless, perfect
enforcement of law.

•

The normalized elimination of practical obscurity.

•

Digital epidermalization and applied junk science
(e.g., digital phrenology).

•

The amplification of surveillance capitalism.

•

Security vulnerabilities.

Finally, even assuming that an individual could consent,
facial recognition systems inevitably will lead to unacceptable
harm to our collective autonomy. In a democracy, it is reasonable
to expect that many people will put greater weight on the costs and
benefits of a particular decision that are relevant to them and
people like them. Such is the pull of tribalism and privilege, which
bias decision-making much like the compromising factors that Kim
emphasizes. In practice, this means if citizens are not members of
minority communities, they might not be sufficiently concerned
with how their gain from facial recognition comes at other people’s
expense. Addressing this hidden cost, Chris Gillard aptly states:
Until we can come to better terms with the disparate impacts
of privacy harms, the privileged will continue to pay for luxury
surveillance, in the form of Apple Watches, IoT toilets,
quantified baby products, Ring Doorbells, and Teslas, while
marginalized populations will pay another price: Surveillance,
with the help of computer data, deployed against them—in the
form of ankle bracelets, license plate readers, drones, facial
recognition, and cell-site simulators. As one group pays to be
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watched, other groups continue to pay the price for being
watched. 50

Over time, when majority groups consent to offers that are costbenefit justified for themselves, large-scale social transformation
can result that compromises the autonomy interests of
marginalized groups. The end result is likely a society that won’t
be able to provide an adequate base level of autonomy protections
for all citizens. For if marginalized groups come to experience the
pervasive chill of having not just their public movements but also
their identities (e.g., gay-identifying algorithms) and mental states
(e.g., emotion detection) monitored—then the rest of society isn’t
justified in making choices that lead to this outcome. The end
result would be the unraveling of obscurity, and with it, the erosion
of democratic legitimacy through tyranny of the majority—an
outcome that Kim characterizes as unjust by assigning primacy to
collective autonomy in her framework.
VI. CONCLUSION: MORATORIA AND BANS
When Kim considers bans in Consentability, she approaches
the issue through the framing of paternalism to inquire into the
liberties the government is justified in curtailing. For example,
she argues that it should not be consentable to smoke tobacco or
marijuana in public due to the adverse harm it can cause to third
parties, but junk food should only be more restrictively regulated,
not banned.51 Bans, however, are not limited to expressions of
state power. In both principle and practice, they also can be
restrictions upon it.
To that end, an unexpected shift in governance has begun.
U.S. cities have started banning government agents from using
Statewide moratoriums on
facial recognition technology.52
government agents are being considered too. 53 Bans, whether
temporary or permanent, are extremely rare in U.S. governance
because lawmakers and policy advocates often make three core
50. Chris Gilliard, Privacy’s Not an Abstraction, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://www.fastcompany.com/90323529/privacy-is-not-an-abstraction.
51. NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS 168-171 (2019).
52. Caroline Haskins, Oakland Becomes Third U.S. City to Ban Facial Recognition,
VICE
MOTHERBOARD
(July
17,
2019),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zmpaex/oakland-becomes-third-us-city-to-banfacial-recognition-xz.
53. Steve LeBlanc, Mass. Lawmakers Aim to Block Facial Recognition Technology,
BOSTON 25 NEWS (June 22, 2019), https://www.boston25news.com/news/masslawmakers-aim-to-block-facial-recognition-technology/960520513.

120

Loyola Law Review

[Vol. 66

presumptions about regulation. The first is that extreme fears
about new technologies should be viewed as over-reactions that
parallel previous panics about technologies that society effectively
adapted to, such as the automobile, radio, and television. 54 The
second is that all dual-use technologies should be integrated into
society through policies that aim to appropriately balance costs
and benefits. 55 The third is that the best approach to regulating
surveillance is through tech-neutral legislation that applies to all
surveillance technologies and does not single out specific ones for
unique treatment.56
For the reasons that we have provided, we believe that these
presumptions do not apply here and conclude that, at a minimum,
moratoriums are justified because the conditions for consentability
for facial recognition technology have not been met. Furthermore,
face surveillance of all kinds presents a panoply of harms, most
notably corrosion of collective autonomy through the chill of
increased surveillance and machines indulge the fatally flawed
notion of perfect enforcement of the law. Neither consent nor
procedural frameworks like warrant requirements are sufficient to
address these harms. As such, we argue face surveillance should
be banned. Regulating the government without also imposing
restrictions on technology companies is insufficient, but a
promising start because, at present, government agents pose the
greatest threats.
As Clare Garvie rightly observes, mistakes with facial
recognition technology can have deadly consequences. 57 This
means they can trample an individual’s right to be free from bodily
harm, the highest of the individual autonomy rights in Kim’s

54. See Adam Thierer, The Great Facial Recognition Technopanic of 2019,
MERCATUS CTR. (May 17, 2019), https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/greatfacial-recognition-technopanic-2019.
55. See, e.g., James O’Neil, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y. TIMES
(June 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial-recognition-policenew-york-city.html; America is Turning Against Facial-Recognition Software,
ECONOMIST
(May
23,
2019),
https://www.economist.com/unitedstates/2019/05/23/america-is-turning-against-facial-recognition-software.
56. See, e.g., Judith Donath, You Are Entering an Ephemeral Bio-Allowed Data
Capture Zone, MEDIUM (July 23, 2018), https://medium.com/@judithd/you-areentering-an-ephemeral-bio-allowed-data-capture-zone-5ecafd2dbdaf.
57. Clare Garvie, Facial Recognition Threatens Our Fundamental Rights, WASH.
POST (July 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/facial-recognitionthreatens-our-fundamental-rights/2018/07/19/a102703a-8b64-11e8-8b2060521f27434e_story.html.
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framework. 58
What happens if a system like this gets it wrong? A mistake
by a video-based surveillance system may mean an innocent
person is followed, investigated, and maybe even arrested and
charged for a crime he or she didn’t commit. A mistake by a
face-scanning surveillance system on a body camera could be
lethal. An officer alerted to a potential threat to public safety
or to himself, must, in an instant, decide whether to draw his
weapon. A false alert places an innocent person in those
crosshairs. 59

Lawmakers could regulate facial recognition a few different
ways, and all but one will lead to an irrevocable erosion of obscurity
and collective autonomy. When considering how to regulate
private commercial use of facial recognition, lawmakers will be
tempted to go back to that old standby regulatory mechanism that
they always reach for when they lack political capital, resources,
or imagination: consent. Consent is attractive because it pays lip
service to the idea that people have diverse preferences, it’s steeped
in the law, and at a glance appears to be a compromise between
competing values and interests. But as Kim demonstrated and we
argue, it is fool’s gold for facial recognition technologies, especially
face surveillance. Even highly regulated and constrained use of
facial recognition technology that has been agreed to will lead to
an erosion of obscurity and a harm to our collective autonomy
without actually serving our individual autonomy interests.
The problem is that there aren’t many proven alternatives to
consent regimes for commercial use of facial recognition that go
beyond mere procedural frameworks. If the E.U.’s General Data
Protection Regulation is any guide, the most prominent alternative
to legitimize collection and processing of face biometric data is to
require companies to have a “legitimate interest” in doing so. 60 But
58. NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019).
59. Garvie, supra note 56.
60. General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 of May 25, 2018, Lawfulness of
Processing, art. 6(1)(f), http://www.privacy-regulation.eu/en/article-6-lawfulness-ofprocessing-GDPR.htm; Recommendations for Implementing Transparency, Consent,
and Legitimate Interest Under the GDPR, CTR. FOR INFO. POL’Y LEADERSHIP (May 17,
2017),
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/28/2017/06/cipl_recommendations_on_transparency_consent_a
nd_legitimate_interest_under_the_gdpr_-19_may_2017-c.pdf (“Legitimate interest
may be the most accountable ground for processing in many contexts, as it requires an
assessment and balancing of the risks and benefits of processing for organisations,
individuals[,] and society . . . . The legitimate interests to be considered may include
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what constitutes a “legitimate interest” is notoriously slippery and
subject to drift. Lawmakers have yet to get serious in using this
concept to significantly rein in the power wielded by data
controllers.
So, if facial recognition becomes entrenched in the private
sector by procedural frameworks, that means that in addition to a
warrant framework’s accretion problem, the government will also
have a backdoor to retroactive surveillance via the personal data
industrial complex.
Through public/private cooperation,
surveillance infrastructure will continue to be built, chill will still
occur, harms will still happen, norms will still change, collective
autonomy still will suffer, and people’s individual and collective
obscurity will bit by bit continue to diminish.
The end result is that even if advocates of consent and
warrant requirements got everything on their wish list, society
would still end up worse off. We would suffer unacceptable harm
to our obscurity and collective autonomy through a barrage of I
agree buttons and search warrants powered by government and
industry’s unquenchable thirst for more access to our lives. There
is only one way to stop the harms of face surveillance. Ban it.

the interests of the controller, other controller(s), groups of individuals[,] and society
as a whole.”); CIPL Examples of Legitimate Interest Grounds for Processing of Personal
Data,
CTR.
FOR
INFO.
POL’Y
LEADERSHIP
(Mar.
16,
2017),
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/final_cipl_examples_of_legitimate_interest
_grounds_for_processing_of_personal_data_16_march_2017.pdf.

